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Abstract
This paper examines how a single female’s investment in healthy body weight is
affected by the quality of single males in her marriage market. A principle concern
in estimation is the presence of market-level unobserved heterogeneity that may be
correlated with changes in single male quality. To address this concern, we employ a
differencing strategy that normalizes the exercise behaviors of single women to those
of their married counterparts. Our main results suggest that when potential mate
quality in a marriage market decreases, single black women invest less in healthy body
weight. For example, we find that a ten percentage point increase in the proportion
of low quality single black males leads to a 5% to 10% decrease in vigorous exercise
taken by single black females. No significant response is found for single white women.
These results highlight the relationship between male and female human capital ac-
quisition that is driven by participation in the marriage market. Our results suggest
that programs designed to improve the economic prospects of single males may yield
positive externalities in the form of improved health behaviors, such as more exercise,
particularly for single black females.
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I Introduction
The obese proportion of the U.S. population grew from 15% in 1980 to 34.3% in 2008.
In addition to the obvious health implications, this growth generated significant economic
costs (Flegal et al., 2010). Reuters estimates that obesity contributed $190 billion to annual
health care costs in the United States in 2012, a figure that exceeds the costs attributable to
smoking (Begley, 2012). Obesity is linked to increased hypertension, heart disease, stroke,
disability, diabetes, and non-health factors such as decreased productivity in the workplace
and stunted human capital formation. The Brookings Institution estimates the aggregate
economic costs of obesity to be $215 billion per year, or 1.4% of GDP (Hammond and Levine,
2010).
While the incidence of obesity among all demographic groups in the United States has
risen considerably since the 1980s, some groups have been disproportionately affected (see
Figure I). The CDC reports that 58.5% of black women over the age of 20 are obese, compared
to a population average of 33.9% (Flegal et al., 2010).1 The demographic discrepancy in
severe (grade 2) obesity is even larger. Black women have a severe obesity rate of 27.9%
compared to a rate of 14.3% for the total population. While the obesity rate (particularly
severe obesity) is highest among black women, the obesity rate among single white women
has exhibited the largest growth rate (45% from 1999 to 2011) of any demographic group
in recent years. According to the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (CDC), the
obesity rate for single black women under age 45 increased by 27% over the same period.
Biologically, body weight is a function of calories ingested and expended. Economically,
the individual’s decision to consume net calories is a function of her incentives to invest in
healthy eating and exercise. Philipson (2001) posits that an unfavorable marriage market for
women may reduce the marginal benefit of pre-marital investment in fitness and therefore
contribute to the high rate of obesity. Black women have exhibited greater obesity rates
1Obesity is generally defined using the Body Mass Index (BMI), which is calculated as BMI =
[weight (lb)/height(in)
2
] ∗ 703. The Centers for Disease Control define obesity as a BMI greater than or
equal to 30. Severe (grade 2) obesity is defined as a BMI greater than or equal to 35.
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Figure 1: Obesity rates among women by race; 1998-1994 and 2009-2010
and faced less favorable marriage prospects than white women since the 1970s (Wilson and
Neckerman, 1986). The U.S Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reports that black males are
incarcerated at nearly seven times the rate of white males, and estimates place the proportion
of black males with a felony conviction as high as one-third. Black men exhibit 100% greater
high school dropout rates and 40% lower college completion rates than white men.2 The
unemployment rate among black men has been approximately twice that of white men since
the 1960’s and black men are also 45% more likely than white men to not participate in
the labor force.3 Conditional on being employed, median wages are 27% lower for black
men than white men.4 The observed disparities in human capital, employment, wages and
incarceration rates are clearly not independent. For example, Western (2002) finds that
2Source: National Center for Education Statistics.
3Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey
4Source: American Community Survey.
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incarceration decreases earnings by between 10-30%, increases search costs when seeking
employment, and limits the set of attainable occupations.
In this paper, we study the effect that single male quality has on a single female’s
investment in healthy body weight.5 Our analysis is empirical. Using panel data from
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System - Selected Metropolitan/Micropolitan Area
Risk Trends (BRFSS-SMART) we measure pre-marital investment in healthy body weight
by minutes of moderate and vigorous exercise per week. As suggested by Becker (1974), we
measure a male’s quality by his earning potential. Thus, defining marriage markets by MSA,
race, and age group, we measure single male quality within a given marriage market using
education, employment, income, and arrests rates.6 Ideally, we would observe the entire
distribution of male quality, which would allow us to analyze the behavioral responses of
single females to shifts in the entire male quality distribution. However, the data allow us to
measure only the proportion of low quality single males within a marriage market (i.e., we
observe high school graduation rates, the unemployment rate, percent with low income, and
arrest rate). We assume that this measure of the proportion of low quality males reflects a
shortage of quality mates (for women) in the marriage market.
We estimate the effect that the proportion of low quality males has on the body weight
investment decisions of the average single female in a marriage market. Our regressions
include year and marriage-market fixed effects, which control for unobservables that vary
by time period (e.g., nationwide economic conditions) and marriage market (e.g., persistent
economic, cultural, and geographic factors) that may be correlated with the characteristics of
single males. However, there are additional unobservables that vary by both time period and
marriage market (e.g., chemical dependency rates, poverty rates, local economic shocks) that
5Throughout this paper we will reference the “quality” of males and females participating in the marriage
market. In all instances, an individual’s quality refers to their value to potential mates. (Burdett and Coles
(2001) use the term “pizazz” to describe a similar value.) In theory, single females receive greater utility
from matching to a high quality male than a low quality male and vice versa.
6The Pew Research Center reports that black-white interracial marriage rates are less than 5% of all
black and white marriages. As such, throughout our analysis we treat marriage markets separately for each
race.
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may be correlated with single male quality. Ignored, this correlation between male quality
and unobservables would bias out results. We address the potential omitted variable bias
by normalizing the average health investments of single women to those of married women
in the same marriage market. We also include differenced control variables and market-level
fixed effects in these regressions to account for time varying observable and time-invariant
unobservable compositional differences between single and married women respectively at
the market level.
Our results suggest that low quality among single males in a marriage market reduces
females’ incentives for pre-martial investment in healthy body weight. In our first model
(i.e., using single women only), we find that single black women exercise less in response
to a decrease in single male quality; a ten percentage point increase in the proportion of
low quality single black males (roughly equivalent to elevating the quality of single black
men in Orlando, FL to that of the single black men in Indianapolis, IN) leads to a 10%
decrease in vigorous exercise taken by single black females.7 The results for white marriage
markets vary in significance and magnitude according to model specification. In our second
model, where single women’s investment in healthy body weight are normalized to that of
the married women, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of low
quality single black males leads to a 5% decrease in vigorous exercise taken by single black
females. Therefore, our econometric correction for time-varying market level unobservables
halves the marginal effect of male quality on pre-marital female investment in healthy body
weight. Our results are robust to marriage markets defined at the state level. We rule out
(empirically) any cross-race effects (i.e., single male quality of one race on single female
health investment of another race) and show that single male quality does not affect the
7We refer to exercise as “investment in health body weight” throughout this paper. However, it is
important to recognize that our results may not generalizable to all health investment decisions. While
exercise and healthy eating improve one’s health, they improve a female’s quality in the marriage market by
decreasing/maintaining her body weight, which betters her appearance. We would not necessarily expect
a similar relationship to exist between single male quality and single female consumption of the influenza
vaccine.
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health investments of married women. These results validate our race-specific definitions of
marriage markets and normalization strategy, respectively.
As an extension, we consider how the effects of male quality may vary over the distri-
bution of female quality. To that end, we regress individual-level single female investment
in health body weight on the proportion of low quality single males in the marriage-market,
control variables, and MSA-level fixed effects. We allow estimated coefficients to vary over
the distribution of single female quality. We find evidence that the health behavioral re-
sponses of single women to changes in single male quality are strongest among females with
less education, income, or higher body weight.
This paper merges several related literatures. Previous work has examined the effects
of mate quality on racial differences in marriage formation (Brien, 1997; Wood, 1995; Wil-
son and Neckerman, 1986). A separate, recent literature has examined the spillover effects
of marriage market imbalance, particularly for black women (Mechoulan, 2011; Finlay and
Neumark, 2010; Lin et al., 2014). While Mechoulan (2011) finds that black females facing an
unfavorable imbalance in the marriage market invest in more human capital (e.g., education),
it is not clear whether these spillover effects are the result of increased or decreased compe-
tition for mates. Women facing a lack of quality mates may invest in more education either
to increase their mating capital or in preparation for financial independence. Our analysis
indicates that an unfavorable marriage market imbalance leads the average single female to
decrease her investment in healthy body weight. This reduction would suggest a decrease
in competition, as an increase in body weight cannot be interpreted as increasing mating
capital. Additionally, this paper is the first to link marriage market conditions directly to
pre-marital investment in healthy body weight. There has been considerable work in the
literature on the effects of obesity on marriage market prospects (Oreffice and Quintana-
Domeque, 2010; Averett et al., 2008), but very little on how marriage market prospects
affect investment in healthy body weight.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the existing literature.
Section III describes the data and sample construction. Section IV contains empirical results
from market-level panel analysis and robustness checks including: analysis at the state level,
cross-race effects, and effects of single males on married women’s investment in healthy body
weight. We then extend the analysis by considering how the effects of low quality males
may vary over the support of the female quality distribution. Section V concludes with
a discussion of the policy implications of our results, the limitations of our analysis, and
directions for future work.
II Related Literature
II.1 Empirical Literature
We are not the first to consider the relationship between marriage market conditions
and pre-marital investments. The theoretical models of Burdett and Coles (2001); Iyigun
and Walsh (2007); Chiappori et al. (2009). describe the pre-marital investments of forward-
looking singles. There is less empirical work on the subject and researchers have focused
primarily on educational investments. Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) estimate a model of
female schooling, (spousal) search, and (spousal) selection. Using data from the Philippines,
they find evidence that single women facing higher sex ratios (men to women) and higher
single male unemployment rates invest less in their educations. Lafortune (2013) studies how
sex ratios impact premarital investments in education and the educational characteristics of
selected occupations of second generation Americans born between 1885 and 1915. She finds
that men and women who face a shortage of potential mates invest in more years of schooling.
Our work also relates to a number of empirical papers suggesting that bodyweight im-
pacts marriage formation differently for men and women. Using the 1997 cohort of NLSY,
Mukhopadhyay (2007) finds that obese women are less likely to be accepted into marriage,
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but that obesity does not affect the incidence of marriage for men. Oreffice and Quintana-
Domeque (2010) find positive assortative mating among spouses in the United States on
weight, height, and BMI. Consistent with Mukhopadhyay, they also find significant penal-
ties for obese women. Female BMI is found to be negatively correlated with husband’s
income, height, and education. Furthermore, Becker (1974) hypothesizes and numerous
studies (e.g., Lichter et al. (1991, 1992); Wilson and Neckerman (1986)) show that while
males are evaluated in a marriage market by their wages and material possessions, women
are typically sought after for non-monetary concerns, such as appearance and education. In
a recent study of online dating responses, Chiappori et al. (2012) found that women must
compensate for an additional 2 units of BMI with an additional year of education.
This paper also joins a growing literature that seeks to understand how the decreasing
number of “marriageable” of black men in the United States, particularly since the 1970s,
has altered the marriage trends and behaviors of black women. Researchers have studied how
changes in the marriageability of single black men has affected both marriage rates (Wood,
1995) and marriage timing (Brien, 1997) in black populations. Recent work by Mechoulan
(2011) and Lin et al. (2014) examines how the increase in incarceration of black men and
the sex ratio imbalance it causes affects the behavior of black women. Mechoulan (2011)
finds that young black women have responded with greater investment in human capital
(e.g., higher educational attainment, increased early employment, and lower teenage fertility
rates). Findings by Lin et al. (2014) suggest that as much as 18% of the growth in obesity
among black females over the 1990s is due to mate shortages incited by increases in the
incarceration of black males.
II.2 Theoretical Literature
Becker (1974) was among the first to study marriage formation as the optimizing be-
havior of rational economic agents. In Becker’s model, which assumed transferable utility,
an individual chose to marry if the utility from marriage was greater than the utility from
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remaining single. In this frictionless setting, Becker showed that assortative matching would
arise if everyone preferred higher (quality) partners. To account for incomplete information,
more recent matching models have allowed for search frictions, while assuming both trans-
ferable (Becker, 1981) and non-transferable (Burdett and Coles, 1997; Smith, 2006) utility.
Much like job seekers in a labor market with frictions, single individuals in these models
are assumed to set a reservation (mate) quality and accept the first offer that exceeds the
threshold. More recent models have amended this earlier work by allowing for pre-marital
investments, which increase an individual’s value in the marriage market (Burdett and Coles,
2001; Iyigun and Walsh, 2007; Chiappori et al., 2009; Lafortune, 2013).
While we do not contribute to the theoretical literature on marriage markets or match-
ing models, our empirical work is motivated by Burdett and Coles (2001) equilibrium model
of self-improvement. In their model, vertically differentiated singles enter the marriage mar-
ket endowed with a particular level of quality or “pizazz.” An individual’s utility from
marriage equals their partners pizazz (i.e., non-transferable utility). A single is able to in-
vest, at a cost, in his/her own pizazz, which may increase the expected (utility) value of a
match. A female’s investment decision is thus influenced by the distribution of both male
and female pizazz, as well as the cost of investment.8 Depending on these factors, the model
would predict that some women engage in costly investment, while other women choose to
enter the marriage market with their original pizazz endowment. In our empirical work, we
will measure how the average female’s body weight investment decision is affected by the
proportion of males in the left tail of the quality, or “pizazz,” distribution. We abstract from
the equilibrium effects of the women’s behavior, leaving this for future work.
8In our paper, a woman’s investment in healthy body weight is akin to investing in her “pizazz.” Our
measure of low male quality within a marriage market provides some measure of the proportion of males to
the left of some arbitrarily low threshold in the male “pizazz” distribution.
9
III Data
The primary data source used in our empirical analysis is the Center for Disease Con-
trol’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS has been conducted
annually since the 1980s and is the world’s largest telephone health survey. The survey is a
repeated cross section, designed to identify trends in health behaviors at the state level to
help state health agencies efficiently allocate resources. Beginning in 2002, the BRFSS be-
gan tracking local trends from metropolitan and micropolitan areas with 500+ respondents.
Our estimation samples are drawn from these data, which are known as BRFSS-SMART
(Selected Metropolitan/Micropolitan Area Risk Trends).
While BRFSS is a repeated cross section, we use sample weights to construct a panel at
the “marriage market” level. A total of 227 MSA’s are included in our four year panel. We
define marriage markets using a race (black/white) and age category combinations within
each MSA.9 The age categories are [18-25), [25-35), [35-45), [45-55), [55-65), and [65,∞). We
have tested whether our results were robust to alternative age bands. We found that relaxing
the age bands to permit overlapping markets (e.g., 25-35 year old females can now pair with
23-37 year old males) did not affect our results substantially.10 An alternative strategy would
be to define age bands (+/- 5 years) around each single women and characterize her mating
pool accordingly. However, this would require a prohibitive number of fixed effects and
render any meaningful analysis using panel methods infeasible.
Table I displays the number of MSA’s tracked for each year, the total number of
marriage markets constructed, and the total number of individual respondents (single and
married) for each year of the BRFSS-SMART used to compose these marriage markets. Of
the 5,757 marriage markets defined by MSA, age group, race, and time, there are 2,130
9We abstract from cohabitation in our analysis as cohabitation is a very small part of the sample. In the
2009 BRFSS, for example, 2.15% of the sample reports being ”part of an unmarried couple.” If we define
cohabitation as broadly as possible, (one man and one woman live together outside of wedlock, regardless
of whether or not they have a romantic, familial, or roommate relationship) less than 12% of the single
population cohabitates.
10Except for women within one year of the upper boundary, these overlapping markets capture 85% of
observed marriage-age-pairs according to the CPS.
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black marriage markets and 3,627 white markets. The BRFSS-SMART only reports results
for MSA’s with at least 500 respondents. Some MSA’s are either insufficiently diverse to
form marriage market estimates for blacks or had insufficient numbers of black respondents
to form reliable estimates. Our MSA-level markets form an unbalanced panel. Table II
displays the number of markets with 1, 2, 3, or 4 observations.
Table I: MSAs, Markets, and Respondents by Wave
Year No. of MSA’s No. of Markets No. of Respondents
2003 102 1,019 129,779
2005 148 1,400 201,539
2007 177 1,700 253,071
2009 173 1,638 250,584
N 5,757 700,583
Our estimation sample includes marriage markets with at least five single men and
five single women satisfying the MSA-race-age criteria. Given our precise definition of a
marriage market, increasing this threshold rapidly decreases the numbers of markets we can
include in the sample. Admittedly, the presence of these small markets calls to question the
representativeness of our results; to which we have two comments. First, including markets
with small numbers of observations is likely to increase the noise in our data. If these
individuals are randomly sampled from the population, these small numbers of individuals
should create classical measurement error, resulting in attenuation bias on our parameters of
interest and therefore understate the true effect. To test for such bias, we repeat our analysis
restricting the sample to markets with a minimum of 10, 15, and 20 individuals of each sex.
These restrictions have little effect on our point estimates, but the smaller sample sizes do
increase the standard errors. Second, we also repeat our analysis with state-level marriage
markets (where BRFSS is representative) to alleviate concerns about non-randomness in
MSA’s with small numbers of respondents. We find that our key results strengthen when we
aggregate to the state level, consistent with alleviating classical measurement error in the
MSA-defined markets.
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Table II: Observations Per Market
Observations Per Market No. of Markets
1 693
2 360
3 264
4 888
The dependent variables in our empirical analysis are minutes of moderate and vigor-
ous exercise per week by single females. After the 2002 initiation of the BRFSS-SMART,
questionnaires in odd years (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009) elicited information on behaviors re-
lated to changes in body weight, including minutes of moderate/vigorous exercise taken.11
Our dependent variables of average minutes of moderate (or vigorous) exercise per week
are formed by averaging over individual reports in each market. We use post stratification
weights in constructing these measures. Summary statistics for our dependent variables are
found in the top 2 rows of Table III.
In each market, we also form measures of male quality, our explanatory variable of
interest. In addition to health information, the BRFSS asks respondents about their highest
degree attained in school, a very coarse categorical income measure, and employment status.
From these reports, we use post-stratification weights to construct three measures of male
quality in each market: the proportion of single males who are high school dropouts, the
proportion of single males who earn less than $20,000 per year,12 and the proportion of single
males who are unemployed for greater than six months or not in the labor force. We supple-
ment this information with average arrest rates by marriage market, which are compiled from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Annual Summary.13 While
11BRFSS also contains information about food intake, but only about healthy food intake, such as ‘servings
of fruits and vegetables per day.’ In considering investment in healthy body weight, we are equally (if not
more) concerned with ‘unhealthy food abstinence’ as we are ’healthy food intake.’ These are two entirely
separate variables, one does not imply the other. In previous versions of the paper, we have considered fruit
and vegetable intake. The results were mixed. We are happy to share them as asked.
12The $20,000 threshold was selected because it is the closest to the U.S. Census Bureau’s poverty line for
a family of four. Under the assumption that males are valued in the marriage market as providers for the
family, the federal poverty line for a family of four provides an objective threshold for insufficient earnings.
13The Bureau of Justice Statistics does not report the marital status of arrestees. We are therefore unable
to separately identify arrest rates for single versus married men.
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related works have measured the impact of the penal system on males using incarceration
rates, we suspect that arrest rates provide a better contemporaneous measure of the correc-
tions aspect of mate quality.14 The UCR reports offenses at the Original Reporting agency
Identifier (ORI; e.g., Knoxville Police Department), both by race and by age-sex, but not
by race-age-sex. Thus, we assume that for a given ORI, the race proportion is constant for
each age-by-sex cell. In other words, we assume that if 40% of the arrestees in a given MSA
were black, then 40% of the 27-year old arrested men are black. We count arrests only for
felony offenses, which are most likely to have long term economic consequences, decreasing
a male’s value as a mates. Summing the offenses for each age-sex cell and distributing racial
proportions, we are able to calculate the proportion of arrested men in a given marriage
market. Summary statistics for our measures of low male quality are in the bottom panel of
Table III.
In each market, we also construct control variables to characterize the population of
single females. We construct market averages that parallel our measures of low quality
males: high school dropout rates, low income rates, and joblessness rates. We do not use
arrest rates among females, which are less than 1% in the median marriage market, and we
add the average number of children per single woman in each market. Summary statistics
for these market average rates are also in Table III.
Our econometric technique requires market-level variation in male quality over time.
Table IV shows the variance of each measure of male quality and the share of that variance
within and between each MSA. The table shows that roughly 45% of the total variation for
our economic measures of male quality comes from within each MSA-level market. We did
the same exercise for marriage markets defined at the state level where BRFSS is designed to
14Incarceration rates alone are likely to understate to impact of the penal system on marriage markets.
While incarceration removes an individual from participating in the market, arrests increase the likelihood
of conviction, which lowers an individual’s economic prospects. As such, arrests probabilistically diminish
an individual’s value in the marriage market. Given that roughly 52% of American males will be arrested
at some point in their life (Tillman, 1987), while only 9.0% will ever be incarcerated (Bonczar and Beck,
1997), identifying externalities of high arrest rates is important. Note also that incarcerated males are not
included in the non-institutionalized population we consider.
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Table III: Market-Level Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Health Markers - Single Females
Minutes of Moderate Exercise Per Week 43.47 26.18 0 180.10
Minutes of Vigorous Exercise Per Week 21.91 18.57 0 108.96
Low Income Rate 0.28 0.19 0 0.75
Joblessness Rate 0.17 0.16 0 0.64
H.S. Dropout Rate 0.11 0.14 0 0.55
Averge Number of Children 0.69 0.63 0 2.51
Mate Quality Rate Variables - Single Males
Arrests Per Capita 0.05 0.07 0 0.32
Low Income Rate 0.22 0.21 0 0.73
Joblessness Rate 0.17 0.19 0 0.64
H.S. Dropout Rate 0.12 0.15 0 0.49
Table IV: Variance of Male Quality Measures Within and Between Markets
Total Proportion Proportion
Variable Variance Between Within
Markets Defined at MSA Geographic Level
H.S. Dropout Rate 0.0238 0.547 0.453
Low Income Rate 0.0433 0.557 0.443
Joblessness Rate 0.0345 0.543 0.457
Arrests Per Capita 0.0042 0.857 0.143
Markets Defined at State Geographic Level
H.S. Dropout Rate 0.0247 0.557 0.443
Low Income Rate 0.0381 0.523 0.477
Joblessness Rate 0.0311 0.496 0.504
Arrests Per Capita 0.0060 0.890 0.110
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be representative. Again, roughly 45% of the total variation in male quality at the state level
comes from within-market variation. A much lower proportion of the variance in Arrests Per
Capita comes from variation within markets. While this may be attributable to properties
of this specific variable, the UCR is true population data whereas the BRFSS is (albeit very
large) sample data. Overall, while the within-market variation at the MSA level may be
larger than expected, the state level BRFSS is designed to be representative. Therefore,
the consistency of within and between shares of variance at the MSA-level and State-level
BRFSS measures provides evidence that our market-level data has adequate variation to
study the relationship between single male quality and female health investment decisions.
IV Empirical Analysis
We empirically evaluate how a single female’s investment in healthy body weight (i.e.,
exercise) responds to a change in the proportion of low quality single males within her
marriage market. In subsection IV.1, we outline our empirical strategy, discuss the primary
sources of bias with which we are concerned, and make explicit the conditions under which
our estimates are unbiased. In subsection IV.1.1, we present our primary findings. In
subsection IV.1.2 we conduct two sets of falsification tests. We also attempt to mitigate
concerns over other potential sources of bias. In subsection IV.2.1 we extend our empirical
analysis to control for sex ratios, demonstrating that our main result can be interpreted as a
quality-based mate shortage. In section IV.2.2 we replicate our preferred specification at the
state level to alleviate concerns about non-representativeness in MSA-markets. Finally, in
section IV.2.3, we use individual-level, cross sectional data to consider how the effect of male
quality on female pre-marital investment in healthy body weight varies over the distribution
of female quality.
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IV.1 Market-Level Empirical Strategy
Let us assume that the average weekly minutes of exercise among single women in
marriage market j and time t can be written as
Ejt = β1Qjt + β2Xjt + αt + γj + jt (1)
where Qjt measures the proportion of low quality single males and Xjt measures average sin-
gle female characteristics in the same marriage market and time period. Our parameter of
interest is β1. To produce an unbiased estimate, we must control for three types of unobserv-
ables which are likely correlated with Qjt. Unobservables that vary by time period, αt, and
unobservables that vary by marriage market, γj, are easily controlled for using separate time
and marriage-market fixed effects. However, we are not able to control for unobservables that
vary by both time period and marriage market, jt, using fixed effects, as time-and-market
fixed effects are not identified without an individual-level panel of observations. We include
control variables, Xjt, which vary by market and time to reduce some of the potential bias
caused by these unobservables, but additional work is needed to reduce this bias further.
For expository purposes, we rewrite jt as
jt = λjt + ηjt (2)
where corr(λjt, Qjt) 6= 0 and corr(ηjt, Qjt) = 0; our endogeneity problem stems from the first
of these two conditions. The standard procedure for addressing this unwanted correlation
is to employ an instrumental variables method; however, we think it unlikely that any
variable that is correlated with Qjt has no other effect on Ejt. Investments in healthy
body weight are made by individuals maximizing their utility, subject to a constraint, while
interacting with the built environment in which they live. Any local variation which affects
the economic characteristics of single males is likely to affect the outcome of the single
woman’s maximization problem by altering either her constraint or the built environment.
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Therefore, we opt for a different strategy, which reduces the correlation between Qjt and jt
by normalizing the outcomes of single women to those of married women in the same time
period and marriage market.
To describe this strategy, we first rewrite Equation 1 for married women as
E˜jt = β˜1Qjt + β˜2X˜jt + α˜t + γ˜j + ˜jt (3)
where all variables and parameters are redefined for married women, except Qjt, which still
defines the quality of single males in market j and time period t. Subtracting (3) from (1)
yields
Ejt − E˜jt = (β1 − β˜1)Qjt + β2(Xjt − X˜jt) + βˆ2X˜jt + (αt − α˜t) + (γj − γ˜j) + (jt − ˜jt) (4)
where βˆ2 = β˜2 − β2. We then make the following two assumptions
1. β˜1 = 0
2. E(Qjt(λjt − λ˜jt)) = 0.
Under these assumptions, Equation 4 reduces to
Ejt − E˜jt = β1Qjt + β2(Xjt − X˜jt) + βˆ2X˜jt + αˆt + γˆj + ˆjt (5)
where αˆt = (αt−α˜t), a time fixed effect; γˆj = (γj−γ˜j), a market fixed-effect, and ˆjt = jt−˜jt
is an i.i.d. random shock. We estimate Equation 5.15
Our identification technique relies on assumptions (1) and (2) above. The first as-
sumption implies that the proportion of low quality single males has no effect on the health
investments of married females; this is tested in Section IV.1.2. The second assumption
15Including married females’ characteristics, X˜jt, has virtually no effect on the parameters of interest, yet
it reduces the adjusted R2 and, therefore, the efficiency of our estimates. As a result, βˆ2X˜jt is not included
in the differencing results presented in Table VII. Supplementary results are available from the authors upon
request.
17
implies that Qjt is exogenous to (Ejt − E˜jt), or that unobserved factors that are correlated
with single male quality have an equal effect on the health behaviors of single and married
females, on average over marriage markets, j, and time periods, t.16 While no statistical test
can validate this assumption, single and married females should be equally affected by the
time-and-market varying unobservables that we consider most likely to be correlated with
Qjt (i.e., local economic conditions, chemical dependency rates, and quality food access).
Even if the condition E(Qjt(λjt − λ˜jt)) = 0 is not met, the endogeneity of Qjt (and, there-
fore, the bias in β1) decreases with greater correlation between λjt and λ˜jt. Therefore, any
correlation between λjt and λ˜jt should reduce bias in β1.
The above should also clarify why analysis is conducted using market-level, rather
than individual-level, data. First, since our data are a repeated cross section, we cannot
observed the same individual in more than one period. Therefore, we cannot evaluate how
that individual will change her investment in healthy body weight as male quality changes,
but we can evaluate how the market average investment changes as male quality changes.
Second, our differencing strategy cannot be conducted using individual level data. The
inability to empirically address λjt at the individual level motivates our use of a market
panel.
IV.1.1 Market-Level Results
Before discussing the results of our differencing regressions, which can be found in
Table VII, we present market-level results for single females (i.e., Equation 1) for comparison
purposes. Tables V and VI contain these base results. The dependent variables are average
minutes of vigorous exercise per week and average minutes of moderate exercise per week
respectively. For both black and white women, we regress these dependent variables on the
16If E(Qjt(λjt− λ˜jt)) = 0 is satisfied, then Qjt is exogenous by definition. The assumption λjt = λ˜jt ∀ j, t
(i.e., that unobserved factors that are correlated with single male quality have an equal effect on the health
behaviors of single and married females for every marriage market and time period), is a stronger assumption,
which is not necessary for the exogeneity of Qjt.
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proportion of low quality single male in the market, while controlling for market-average
single female characteristics.
We estimate each model twice, utilizing different strategies to measure single male
quality. Our first strategy allows the four market-level measures of single male quality
discussed above to enter as separate independent regressors. The advantage of this strategy
is that it enables us to examine which specific characteristics of quality are most important.
However, the joint effect of the multiple measures can be difficult to interpret and sometimes
yields mixed results (see Tables XV - XVI). One solution to this problem is to simulate the
marginal effect of a proportional increase in all four measures of low male quality, which yields
a single marginal effect that is easy to interpret. Our second strategy uses a single-index
measure of male quality from the first principal component of the four market-level measures.
In contrast with the multivariate approach, this strategy yields marginal effect that is easily
interpreted. However, nearly half the information available in the four measures of single
male quality is discarded when we use only the first principal component (Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) statistic of 0.531).17 Given the strengths and weaknesses of each method,
we conduct analysis using both. We believe each method provides insight on whether the
quality of single males affects single females’ health investment, but find neither method to
be strictly preferable.
Table V (vigorous exercise) and VI (moderate exercise) contains the results of our
panel data regressions for the full sample (Column 1), for white women (Column 2), and
black women (Column 3). Panel A results are found using multiple measures of low male
quality, while Panel B results use the single-index measure of low male quality. For ease of
interpretation, we report simulated marginal effects for our multivariate (Panel A) results
throughout. Individual parameter estimates for each quality measure are shown in the
appendix. To generate this marginal effect, we first take 10,000 draws from the covariance
matrix of our estimates. Using these draws, we simulate single female behavior once using
17The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic is a measure of sampling adequacy. The principle component analysis
literature suggests that a KMO statistic below 0.5 is “unacceptable” (i.e., one should not factor).
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observed single male quality, a second time with a 10% increase in all four (low) single
male quality measures, and a third time with a 10 percentage point increase in the same
four measure of (low) single male quality. We calculate the average minutes of weekly
exercise within each marriage market for each simulation, and report in the table the average
percentage change in exercise behavior across markets in response to the changes in male
quality. Also in Panel A, we report the F-statistic and p-value for the joint significance of
the multivariate measure of mate quality, which are derived from analytical tests of the joint
significance of the parameters, not the simulated marginal effects.18 All regressions control
for marriage-market fixed effects and year fixed effects. In all specifications, standard errors
have been clustered at the MSA level.
Table V: Market Level Results: Average Minutes of Vigorous Exercise, Single Women
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality
Simulated Marginal Effects
All Races White Only Black Only
(10 pct point increase in low quality) -11.2% -29.5% -9.8%
(10 % increase in low quality) -1.4% -1.2% -1.6%
F-statistic 2.58 3.55 1.98
P-value 0.036 0.006 0.096
Joint Significance 1% 1% 10%
Panel B: Principle Component Measure of Male Quality
All Races White Only Black Only
First Component -0.97 -0.53 -1.25
**(0.38) (0.51) **(0.54)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4525 3004 1521
All regressions include controls for market characteristics of single females and clustered standard errors.
Simulated Marginal Effects are calculated using 10,000 bootstrap draws from the covariance matrix of the
estimates for the multivariate measure of male quality. See Table XV for point estimates.
18Whether the simulated marginal effect is significantly different from zero can be artificially determined
by the number of draws from the covariance matrix used in simulation. We use a large number of draws, so
all marginal effects are highly significant. With the previous caveat, the analytical test of joint significance
(and resulting F-statistics and p-values) provide a more rigorous rejection of the null hypothesis of joint
insignificance than simulated marginal effects.
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The results of our vigorous exercise regressions can be observed in Table V. Focusing
first on Panel A, we find that the joint effect of the multiple measures of low male quality
on single females’ vigorous exercise is significant at the 1% level for white women and 10%
level for black women. The simulations suggest that the marginal effect of a 10% increase
in the proportion of low quality males leads single black (white) women to decrease their
vigorous exercise by 1.6% (1.2%), while a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of
low quality males leads single black (white) women to decrease their vigorous exercise by
9.8% (29.5%). Note that while it is reasonable to assume that policy or other economic shocks
could cause a 10% change in either black or white male quality in most marriage markets, a
10 percentage point change in the proportion of low quality while males is superfluous. The
observed proportion of low quality males is considerably higher in black marriage markets
than in white ones; the difference is most notable with arrest rates. On average, for black
men there are 0.12 arrests per capita per year, a figure four times that of white men (0.03).
Thus, the predicted decrease in vigorous exercise for single white women in response to the
10 percentage point change in male quality is driven almost entirely by the quadrupling of
the arrest rate. For this reason, little attention should be paid to the result. The PCA
results in Panel B confirm the multivariate results. While the effect of low male quality
on market-average vigorous exercise by single females is still significant for the full sample
and for single black women (a 10 percentage point increase in our (low) quality measure
decreases average vigorous exercise for single women and single black women by 3.0% and
8.4%, respectively), it is no longer significant for white women. This result is intuitive; lack
of variation in arrest rates causes the the PCA index to places lower weight on arrest rates
than the other economic measures. The result suggests that arrest rates are the primary
driver of joint significance for white women in the multivariate model.
Our results for moderate exercise can be found in Table VI. Unlike the results for
vigorous exercise, none of the multivariate regressions yield estimates in which the four
coefficients on low male quality are jointly significant. For white women, we find that an
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increase in the proportion of low quality single males leads to a decrease in moderate exercise
(with 5% significance) when using the index from the first principal component. This result
suggests that a ten percent increase in the proportion of low quality single white males leads
to a 3% decrease in moderate exercise by single white women. For black women, we find no
effect on moderate exercise.
Briefly summarizing the results from our market-level regressions so far, an increase in
the proportion of low quality males leads to a decrease in market-average vigorous exercise
by single black women. The evidence that a greater proportion of low quality males de-
creases exercise among single white women is mixed for both exercise type and male quality
specifications.
Table VI: Market Level Results: Average Minutes of Moderate Exercise, Single Women
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality
Simulated Marginal Effects
All Races White Only Black Only
(10 pct point increase in low quality) -2.8% -5.4% -1.5%
(10 % increase in low quality) -0.3% -0.4% -0.3%
F-statistic 0.97 1.20 0.86
P-value 0.422 0.309 0.488
Joint Significance None None None
Panel B: Principle Component Measure of Male Quality
All Races White Only Black Only
First Component -0.82 -1.15 -0.58
*(0.50) **(0.58) (0.73)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4525 3004 1521
All regressions include controls for market characteristics of single females and clustered standard errors.
Simulated marginal effects are calculated using 10,000 bootstrap draws from the covariance matrix of the
estimates for multivariate measure of male quality. See Table XV for point estimates.
The results from our differencing regressions (i.e., Equation 5) are presented in Table
VII. Recall, the dependent variables measure the difference in average investment in healthy
body weight between single and married women in a given marriage market and time period.
We regress these differenced variables on our previously defined market-level measures of low
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male quality and differenced market-level female characteristics. Using both multivariate and
single-index measures of male quality, we find no statistically significant effect of low quality
single white males on single white female health investments. For black women, we find that
the joint effect of the multivariate measure of low quality males is statistically significant
at the 10% level for vigorous, but not moderate exercise. However, the marginal effects are
negative for both types of exercise. A 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of low
quality males leads to a 5% decrease in vigorous exercise taken by single black women. We
find similar results when estimation is conducted with the single-index measure of male qual-
ity. An increase in the proportion of low quality males decreases average vigorous exercise
among single black women in the population (at a 5% level of significance) and has a nega-
tive, though insignificant, effect on average moderate exercise. This marginal effect can be
interpreted as follows: If the quality of males in a given marriage market deteriorates from
median quality to 25th percentile quality, single black women will decrease their vigorous
exercise by 10%.
For both races, the simulated marginal effect of a 10% increase in low male quality on
vigorous exercise under our differencing specification is roughly 20% lower than our results
in Table V. Furthermore, the marginal effect of a 10 percentage point increase on vigorous
exercise is approximately halved for black women when we difference the single women from
the married women. These results are fairly consistent with the findings from the single-index
model. For black women, the marginal effect of an increase in low male quality on vigorous
exercise is negative and 35% lower in the differencing model than in the base model. These
results suggest that an increase in the proportion of low quality single black males decreases
the vigorous exercise taken by single black women within a marriage market. Furthermore,
differencing married women from single women is effective at reducing bias from time-and-
market varying unobserved heterogeneity. Recall that the differencing regression results
can be interpreted as unbiased estimates of the effect of low male quality on single female
investment in health body weight only if the effect of low single male quality on married
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female investment in healthy body weight is zero. We test that assumption in the next
section.
Table VII: Market Level Differencing Regression: Single- Married Women
White Women Black Women
Mod. Ex. Vig. Ex. Mod. Ex. Vig. Ex.
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality
Simulated Marginal Effects
(10 pct point increase in low quality) 4.6% -26.3 % -1.8% -5.0%
(10 % increase in low quality) 0.3% -1.0% -0.4% -1.3%
F-statistic 0.59 1.16 0.81 2.10
P-value 0.671 0.327 0.52 0.079
Joint Significance None None None 10%
Panel B: Principle Component Measure of Male Quality
First Component 0.52 -0.04 -0.94 -1.68
(0.92) (0.64) (1.36) **(0.85)
N 3561 3561 1611 1611
All regressions include controls for differenced market characteristics of females, time fixed effects, marriage-market
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors. Simulated marginal effects are calculated using 10,000 bootstrap draws from
the covariance matrix of the estimates for multivariate measure of male quality. See Table XVI for point estimates.
Percentage change calculated with average exercise among single females as the base, rather than the difference.
Ultimately, the exercise of single females, not the spread, is the outcome of interest.
IV.1.2 Market-Level Falsification Checks
We subject the MSA-level results to two falsification tests. First, we regress the aver-
age vigorous exercise taken by single females on the proportion of low quality single males
from the other race in the same MSA-age marriage market. Data from Pew Research Center
show that individuals in the United States primarily marry within their own race (Taylor,
2010). As such, the characteristics of white 25-34 year old males in St. Louis should have
a much smaller effect on the incentives of black females to invest in healthy body weights.
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that marriage markets are separated by race. We
show below that the quality of the males of one race does not affect investment in healthy
body weight by females of the other race, which validates our within-race definition of a
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marriage market. Second, we regress marriage-market level average investment in healthy
body weight by married women on the proportion of low quality single males and the usual
set of control variables (high school dropout rate, kids per capita, low income rates and job-
lessness rates). With this regression, we test the validity of the assumptions underlying our
differencing regressions, namely that single male quality does not affect post-marital invest-
ment in healthy body weight. Given the consistency of PCA and multivariate regressions in
the previous section, we conduct this analysis using the single-index measure of male quality
only for ease of interpretation.
Results from these two falsification tests can be observed in Table VIII. Columns 1
and 2 contain the results of the cross-racial falsification test. We find that for both races
and both behaviors related to investment in healthy body weight, the results are statistically
insignificant from zero. We interpret this as a validation of our MSA-level results and race-
specific definitions of marriage markets. The results for the regressions of married women’s
exercise on single male quality are found in columns 3-4. We find that the effect of the
proportion of low quality single males on all black married female investment and white
married female vigorous exercise is insignificantly different from zero. In general, these
results support our differencing strategy as an effective means to control for market-and-
time varying unobserved heterogeneity. We do find that married white women’s moderate
exercise behavior is significantly increasing in single white male quality (i.e., an increase in
the proportion of low quality single males leads married white women to exercise less). While
this violates our assumption of no relationship, the impact of this result on the differenced
marginal effect is straightforward. Returning to Equation 4, we estimate (β1 − β˜1), but are
interested in β1. Finding that β˜1 is negative suggests that our differencing regression results
are biased up. This explains why low male quality decreased moderate exercise for single
white women in our level specification but not when differenced against the married women.
Several other potential sources of bias have been considered. First, location choice is
endogenous. Individuals’ location choices may be affected by marriage market conditions
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Table VIII: Falsification Tests: Cross-Race Estimation & Married Women
Cross-Race Effects Married Women
White Women Black Women White Women Black Women
Principle Component Measure of Male Quality
Vigorous Exercise -0.03 0.02 -0.37 0.58
(0.26) (0.78) 0.37 (0.72)
Moderate Exercise -0.10 0.69 -1.52 0.19
(0.33) (1.30) **(0.76) (1.15)
N 3004 1521 3004 1521
All regressions include controls for market characteristics of single females, time fixed effects, marriage-market fixed effects,
and clustered standard errors.
as well as economic conditions. If individuals who are competitive in the marriage market
(and presumably investing in healthy body weight) move to areas with concentrations of
high mate quality, our results would be biased away from zero. Data from the American
Community Survey (ACS) mitigate, but do not eliminate this concern. Approximately
3.3% of single individuals move between different states per year according to ACS 5-year
estimates. Contrary to the idea of high potential individuals moving to locations with more
favorable mating pools, geographic mobility is highest among those with less education and
less income. Intrastate annual migration is 4.5% for those making less than $15,000 per
year compared to 2% for those earning more than $65,000 per year. The interstate annual
migration rate is 3.0% for those earning less than $15,000 per year compared to 2.1% for
those earning more than $65,000 per year. Two other factors mitigate our concerns: much
migration among single people is from rural areas to cities - our analysis is already restricted
to cities. Additionally, we control for changing characteristics of the single female population
of an MSA by including variables for single females’ high school dropout rates, joblessness
rates, low income status rates, and number of children per single female.
Selection into marriage creates another potential concern. If changes in male quality
alters whether some women get married, the observed change in pre-marital investment in
healthy body weight may simply reflect changes in the composition of the population of
single women. We rely on our female quality control variables to mitigate potential bias. We
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also note that there are well documented differences in exercise trends between married and
single women. To address these differences, our differencing regressions include a constant
to capture global differences in exercise between the sexes and contain marriage market level
fixed effects to capture local variation in exercise behavior (unrelated to single male quality)
between married and single women.
IV.2 Empirical Extension
IV.2.1 Controlling for Differences in Sex-Ratio
While our analysis is focused on the effects of low quality single males, a related lit-
erature has examined the effect of market-level sex ratios on investment in human capital
(Mechoulan, 2011; Lafortune, 2013; Lin et al., 2014). For example, Lin et al. find that
unfavorable sex ratios induced by the expansion of the criminal justice system contributes
to obesity among single black females. In this section, we repeat our MSA-level (non-
differencing) analysis using our single-index measure of the proportion of low quality males,
while controlling for sex-ratio at the marriage market level to see if the response to quality
varies by sex ratio.
Table IX contains our results. Denoting the female-to-male ratio FMR, in Columns 1
and 2 we split the sample on whether there is a shortage of males (FMR > 1) or a surplus
of males (FMR < 1). We find that the effect of an increased proportion of low quality
males on single female investment in healthy body weight increases when there is already
a shortage of males. For single black women facing a mate shortage, the additional effect
of a high proportion of low quality mates on vigorous exercise is negative and significant at
the 1% level. For white women, the larger effect is on moderate exercise for women facing a
mate shortage (10% significance). This result is intuitive. In a market already characterized
by a shortage of males, an increase in the proportion of low quality males will increase the
number of women who cannot find a suitable mate, potentially leading these women to quit
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the marriage market. In contrast, a market with a surplus of males provides some buffer for
women facing a downward shift in male quality.
Table IX: Market Level Regressions - by Race and Sex Ratio
Principal Component
Measure of Male Quality
Variable FMR<1 FMR>1
Black Women
Vigorous Exercise -0.35 ***-1.66
Moderate Exercise -0.15 -0.82
N 450 1071
White Women
Vigorous Exercise -1.07 0.04
Moderate Exercise -1.11 *-1.23
N 1364 1640
All regressions include controls for market characteristics of single
females, time fixed effects, marriage-market fixed effects, and clus-
tered standard errors. FMR is the ratio of Females/Males in a given
market.
IV.2.2 State-Level Analysis
Brien (1997) finds evidence that even using large data sets (i.e., Decennial Census,
Sample A) that MSA-level measures of economic indicators are troubled by measurement
error. If classical measurement error is present in our MSA-level estimates, then the true
effect low quality single males on female health behaviors should be stronger than our esti-
mates due to attenuation bias. Therefore, to verify that our results are not driven entirely by
some endogenous measurement error, we repeat our preferred differencing specification using
state-level data from BRFSS. While BRFSS-SMART is weighted to increase representative-
ness at the MSA level, it is not fundamentally designed to be representative at the MSA
level. BRFSS, however, is designed to be representative at the state level. While we view the
MSA as the correct geographic definition of a marriage market, we do view these state-level
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results as validation of our findings at the MSA level.19 Furthermore, these results may be
seen as a robustness check against any problems related to small numbers of observations is
MSA-market cells.
The results of the differencing regressions (married from single women) of health in-
vestment on the market-level measures of single men are found in Table X. In using the
multivariate approach, none of the estimated coefficients are jointly significant for white
women. Single black women are shown to decrease moderate and vigorous exercise by 2.2%
and 3.6% in response to a 10% increase in the proportion of low quality males; coefficients
are jointly significant at the 5% level. This compares to respective a 0.4% and 1.3% decreases
at the MSA-level, suggesting our MSA-level results may suffer from classical measurement
error due to attenuation bias. Similar to our previous specifications, we also conduct regres-
sions with a PCA-created single-index measure of male quality.20 With this measure of mate
quality, our results for the effect of mate quality on vigorous exercise for black women are
negative and significant at the 5% level, though the point estimate is very close to that found
with an MSA-level definition of marriage markets (Table VII, Column 6). Again supporting
the notion that our MSA-level results may suffer from attenuation bias, we find that an
increase in the proportion of low quality males has a negative effect (1% level of significance)
on black single female moderate exercise at the state level, but no significant effect at the
MSA level.
IV.2.3 Heterogeneous Investment: Variation over the Female Quality Distri-
bution
Thus far, we have conducted our analysis using market averages over single women.
However, it is probable that the response of single females’ investment in health body weight
19Brien (1997) finds that state-level “marriage-market” variables outperform indicators of “marriageabil-
ity” defined at the local level due to considerable measurement error at the local level.
20(KMO=0.515)
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Table X: Differencing Regression - Single vs. Married Women, Health Behaviors, State Level
White Women Black Women
Mod. Ex. Vig. Ex. Mod. Ex. Vig. Ex.
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality
Simulated Marginal Effects
(10 pct point increase in low quality) 32.2% -17.6% -9.6% -22.3%
(10 % increase in low quality) 1.6% -0.8% -2.2% -3.6%
F-statistc 1.71 0.91 2.98 2.94
P-value 0.147 0.457 0.020 0.022
Joint Significance None None 5% 5%
Panel B: Principle Component Measure of Male Quality
First Component -0.59 -1.47 -2.93 -1.50
(1.58) (1.29) ***(1.13) **(0.70)
N 1256 1255 877 879
All regressions include controls for differenced market characteristics of females, time fixed effects, marriage-market
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors. Simulated Marginal Effects are calculated using 10,000 bootstrap draws
from the covariance matrix of the estimates for the multivariate measure of male quality.
to changes in male quality varies over the distribution of female quality.21 To evaluate
whether the response in female pre-marital investment in healthy body weight varies by
female quality, we must move to individual level data.22
To assess the effects of prospective mate quality on individual single female health
behaviors, we use individual-level data from females in the BRFSS-SMART and the calcu-
lated market-level characteristics for single men. To split the sample on the basis of female
quality, we use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to rotate the individual female
categorical reports of income, education, and body weight into a single, continuous index
of female quality.23 We then split the sample into quintiles of female quality. As in our
21This is especially true with our empirical analysis, as our measures of male quality are in fact capturing
the proportion of low quality males.
22In nearly all MSA’s, we do not have enough observations to split the market into quality-quintiles by
market. The cross sectional nature of the data also prevents us from utilizing any differencing methodology.
Whereas in the market analysis, we utilize a type of triple difference (between married and single; over time;
as male quality changes) the static diff-in-diff framework requires observation in the treatment/control group
(married/single) be exogenous. We do not find that assumption credible in this context.
23MCA and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) both are data reduction tools, used for transforming
multi-variate measures into a single measure. Whereas PCA is used to transform continuous variables into
a single-index variable, MCA is used to transform discrete categorical variables into a single-index variable.
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market-level regressions, we consider two specific health investment behaviors: minutes of
moderate exercise per week and minutes of vigorous exercise per week. We use an ordered
probit specification for each behavior.24 In all regressions, we control for a female education,
income, employment, number of children, age-category fixed effects, and MSA-level fixed ef-
fects. Unlike our market-level regressions, we can now include a time-trend variable for each
MSA. Mirroring our market-level analysis, we employ a multivariate specification with sim-
ulated marginal effects and analytical tests for joint significance, and a single-index measure
of male quality constructed from the first principal component. For each quintile of female
quality we regress single female investment in healthy body weight on the multivariate (or
PCA) measure of male quality with aforementioned controls and fixed effects.
Table XI contains the results of our regressions using hours of vigorous exercise as
the dependent variable. Panel A contains the results from our multivariate specification
of low male quality. We find jointly significant effects (at the 1% level) of male quality
on hours of vigorous exercise for only single black women in the lowest quintile of female
quality. To calculate the marginal effect of a change in the proportion of low quality males we
increase each measure of low male quality by both 10 percentage points (top row) and 10%
(second row). Among single black females in the lowest quality quintile, the only subset for
which the estimated coefficients are jointly significant, a 10 percentage point increase in the
proportion of low quality single males decreases vigorous exercise by 15.8%. A 10% increase
in the proportion of low quality single males decreases vigorous exercise by 3.4%. Parameter
estimates are available in Table XIII. Panel B contains our findings from the PCA-derived
single index specification. For black women in the bottom quintile of the quality distribution,
an increase in low male quality decreases the amount of vigorous exercise undertaken. A ten
The variables for males are market-level averages and, as such, are continuous. The female variables are
at the individual level and are categorical, hence the need to use different techniques for male and female
quality.
24While both exercise variables are continuous, the distribution of responses is multi-modal with consider-
able mass at each hour mark. We therefore discretize the individual reports of exercise using a floor function
with hours as units.
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percent increase in the proportion of low quality single males decreases vigorous exercise by
3.6%. This result is significant at the 5% level.
Table XI: Individual Level Results, Ordered Probit: Hours of Vigorous Exercise Per Week
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality - Marginal Effects
Black Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
(10 pct point increase in low quality) -15.8% 2.8% 10.2% -8.8% 1.2%
(10 % increase in low quality) -3.4% -0.2% 2.9% -1.6% 0.1%
χ2 value (Joint Sig. of Parameters) 15.73 3.84 7.74 3.79 2.48
P-value .003 0.428 0.101 0.436 0.648
Joint Significance 1% None None None None
White Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
(10 pct point increase in low quality) -17.2% 5.1% -5.9% -3.9% 0.3%
(10 % increase in low quality) -0.1% -0.1% -0.4% -0.0% 0.2%
χ2 value (Joint Sig. of Parameters) 6.63 2.87 5.94 1.83 2.80
P-value 0.156 0.579 0.203 0.766 0.591
Joint Significance None None None None None
Panel B: Univariate measure (First Principal Component) by female quality quintile
Black Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
PCA Index -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01
**(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
PCA Index 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
All regressions include individual controls, MSA fixed effects, MSA fixed effects interacted with a time trend, and clustered
standard errors. Simulated marginal effects are calculated using 10,000 bootstrap draws from the covariance matrix of the
estimates for the multivariate measure of male quality.
Table XII contains the results for our regressions using hours of moderate exercise as
the dependent variable. Similar to the Panel A results for vigorous exercise, we find jointly
significant effects (at the 10% level) of low male quality on hours of moderate exercise for only
single black women in the lowest quintile of quality. Increasing each of the four measures of
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low male quality by 10% and 10 percentage points leads to a decrease in moderate exercise by
low quality black women; 2% and 10.6%, respectively. An important finding from this table
is that the decrease in vigorous exercise for single black women in the lowest quality quintile
is being compounded by, rather than offset by, responses in moderate exercise. Parameter
estimates are available in Table XIV. In Panel B, we find that the effect of the single-index
measure of male quality on single black females’ moderate exercise is negative and significant
at the 5% level for women in the lowest quintile of quality. For these women, a 10% increase
in the proportion of low quality males leads to a 1.6% decrease in moderate exercise. Counter
to our primary results for black females, Panel B shows that an increased proportion of low
quality single males leads to decreased exercise by high quality (4th quintile) white females.
In summary, our individual-level cross-sectional analysis produces two primary results.
First, we consistently find that single black women at the low end of the quality distribution
exercise less when there is a greater proportion of low quality males. This result holds for
vigorous and moderate exercise, under multivariate and single index measures of male quality.
Second, we find mixed evidence on whether single white women change their investment in
healthy body weight in response to a change in the proportion of low quality males in
the market. Note that these results are only suggestive of a causal relationship between
single male quality and single female health investment that varies over the female quality
distribution. While we have controlled for MSA-level fixed effects and MSA-specific time
trends, it is possible that time specific MSA-shocks can cause both a deterioration in single
male quality and a decrease in single female investment in health body weight. Furthermore,
we recognize that BMI is endogenous to exercise decisions in the PCA/MCA analysis. As
higher body weight lowers mate quality, the women in the lowest quintile typically do not
exercise very much. As such, if there is any bias from subdividing the sample partially on
the basis of BMI, it is towards zero. Additionally, since exercise is discrete and bounded
below by zero, the variation in exercise behavior for those women in the bottom quintile is
primarily on the extensive margin.
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Table XII: Individual Level Results, Ordered Probit: Hours of Moderate Exercise Per Week
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality - Marginal Effects
Black Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
(10 pct point increase in low quality) -10.6% 2.8% 1.7% 1.0% 1.8%
(10 % increase in low quality) -2.0% -0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6%
χ2 value (Joint Sig. of Parameters) 7.91 3.76 0.76 0.81 1.29
P-value .090 0.439 0.943 0.937 0.8626
Joint Significance 10% None None None None
White Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
(10 pct point increase in low quality) 7.8% -4.7% -2.0% 1.0% -2.6%
(10 % increase in low quality) 0.8% -0.4% -0.6% -0.1% -0.2%
χ2 value (Joint Sig. of Parameters) 3.72 3.77 1.51 6.83 2.95
P-value 0.445 0.437 0.825 0.145 0.567
Joint Significance None None None None None
Panel B: Univariate measure (First Principal Component) by female quality quintile
Black Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
PCA Index -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01
**(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
PCA Index 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) ***(0.01) (0.01)
All regressions include individual controls, MSA fixed effects, MSA fixed effects interacted with a time trend, and clustered
standard errors. Simulated marginal effects are calculated using 10,000 bootstrap draws from the covariance matrix of the
estimates for the multivariate measure of male quality.
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V Discussion
This paper examines how a single female’s investment in healthy body weight is affected
by the quality of single males in her marriage market. We find that a greater proportion of
low quality mates in a marriage market leads to decreased investment in healthy body weight
by single females, particularly for black females. This result holds when marriage markets
are defined at both the MSA and state level. Additional empirical analysis suggests that the
impact of low male quality is strongest in marriage markets with a shortage of males and on
single black women who are less educated, low income, and heavy.
None of our results suggest increased competition for mates in response to a reduction
in mate quality. Previous work on the effects of mate shortage on human capital investment
(Mechoulan, 2011; Lafortune, 2013) have found that a shortage of mates yields increased
investment. By contrast, our results are consistent with Lin et al. (2014), who find that
mate shortage is associated with increased obesity rates among single females. In fact, when
we control for sex ratios, we find that the negative effects of low quality males are strongest
for black women in the presence of a mate shortage. These inconsistencies in pre-marital
investment behavior can be explained by either of the following two conditions: (1) investing
in education/labor market human capital is more cost effective than investing in healthy
body weight, or (2) that the increased investment in education under shortage conditions
reflects preparation for financial independence.
On the source of racial differences in mate quality, previous studies have examined the
relationship between incarceration rates and female investment in human capital and obesity.
Our results show that conditional on an observed mate shortage (induced by incarceration or
not), low quality among the remaining candidates matters. We believe that abstracting from
mate quality and focusing purely on mate shortage understates the impact of incarceration
on pre-marital investment in body weight and family formation. While sentences are often
short (BJS estimates expected time served for a drug trafficking conviction at 28 months),
felony convictions carry severe consequences for earning potential for the balance of the
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individual’s life. Insofar as women value marriage as a means of financial support, while
the expansion of the corrections system in the United States increased in the proportion of
males of all races with low economic value, black males have been disproportionately affected.
Charles and Luoh (2010) find that a one 1% increase in incarceration rates decreases the
proportion of women who marry by 2.4%.
While we show that the economic characteristics of the mating pool affect investment
in healthy body weight by single women more than arrest rates, the corrections system is
still an appropriate point for a policy intervention. Specifically, the removal of the ‘have
you been convicted of a felony’ box from job applications, at least for non-violent drug
offenses, may improve the economic prospects for many once-incarcerated black men. Our
analysis suggests that the economic result of this policy change will likely create positive
health externalities for single black women. Although black women comprise 6.5% of the
U.S. Population, they make up 17.7% of the morbidly obese U.S. population. Given the scale
of societal costs of obesity and the high rates of obesity (60%) and morbid obesity (28%)
among black women, any policy that yields positive health externalities for black women is
worthy of further study.
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Table XIII: Parameter Estimates from Multivariate Approach: Table XI
Individual Vigorous Exercise on Multivariate Measure of Mate Quality
Black Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males -0.21 -0.17 0.23 -0.13 0.29
(0.27) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Low Income Rate - Single Males 0.06 -0.22 0.23 -0.17 0.22
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20)
Arrest Rate - Single Males -0.58 0.54 1.00 -0.47 -0.19
(0.92) (0.80) (0.65) (0.74) (0.62)
Jobless Rate - Single Males -0.54 -0.10 0.09 -0.11 -0.21
***(0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19)
White Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males 0.07 0.06 -0.11 -0.03 0.09
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Low Income Rate - Single Males 0.13 0.09 0.14 -0.12 -0.05
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Arrest Rate - Single Males -1.62 0.54 -0.42 -0.36 -0.18
**(0.80) (0.87) (0.85) (0.61) (0.80)
Jobless Rate - Single Males -0.03 -0.20 -0.11 0.06 0.18
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
All regressions include individual controls, MSA fixed effects, MSA fixed effects interacted with a time trend, and
clustered standard errors.
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Table XIV: Parameter Estimates from Multivariate Approach: Table XII
Individual Moderate Exercise on Multivariate Measure of Mate Quality
Black Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males 0.16 -0.15 0.04 0.09 0.05
(0.22) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15)
Low Income Rate - Single Males -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Arrest Rate - Single Males -0.94 0.72 0.25 0.17 0.06
(0.69) (0.58) (0.68) (0.68) (0.57)
Jobless Rate - Single Males -0.29 -0.13 -0.00 -0.08 0.14
**(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
White Women
Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.26 0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) **(0.13) (0.14)
Low Income Rate - Single Males 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)
Arrest Rate - Single Males 0.78 -0.37 -0.06 0.53 -0.47
(0.74) (0.75) (0.76) (0.67) (0.79)
Jobless Rate - Single Males 0.18 -0.22 -0.09 0.08 -0.14
(0.12) *(0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
All regressions include individual controls, MSA fixed effects, MSA fixed effects interacted with a time trend, and
clustered standard errors.
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Table XV: Parameter Estimates: Multivariate Approach for Tables V & VI
All Races White Only Black Only
Panel A: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality - Vigorous Exercise
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males -2.40 -6.31 -0.11
(2.85) *(3.47) (4.27)
Low Income Rate - Single Males -5.01 -1.57 -6.62
**(2.12) (3.10) **(2.80)
Arrest Rate - Single Males -20.86 -72.47 -8.03
*(11.66) ***(24.81) (12.91)
Jobless Rate - Single Males -1.59 0.73 -3.30
(2.17) (3.10) (2.98)
Panel B: Multivariate Measure of Male Quality - Moderate Exercise
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males 0.47 -6.21 4.52
(3.16) (4.36) (6.18)
Low Income Rate - Single Males -5.23 -1.44 -7.91
*(3.23) (3.72) *(4.68)
Arrest Rate - Single Males -6.37 -13.54 -4.19
(17.67) (31.38) (20.82)
Jobless Rate - Single Males -1.09 -4.39 1.48
(3.04) (3.39) (4.70)
All regressions include controls for market characteristics of single females and clustered standard errors.
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Table XVI: Market Level Differencing Regression Multivariate Parameter Estimates, Table
VII
White Women Black Women
Mod. Ex. Vig. Ex. Mod. Ex. Vig. Ex.
Panel A: Multivariate Estimates - Differencing Regressions (MSA Level)
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males 0.63 -2.31 -4.88 -3.33
(6.71) (4.43) (8.07) (6.24)
Low Income Rate - Single Males 6.43 -1.12 -11.97 -13.32
(0.08) (4.50) *(7.54) ***(4.93)
Arrest Rate - Single Males 16.58 -70.18 -3.03 5.24
(54.71) *(39.91) (36.39) (23.87)
Jobless Rate - Single Males -2.87 2.73 2.06 5.99
(4.71) (3.72) (7.79) (5.43)
N 3561 3561 1611 1611
Panel B: Multivariate Estimates - Differencing Regressions (State Level)
H.S. Dropout Rate - Single Males -7.65 -8.25 13.04 -1.30
(10.02) (7.73) (9.59) (5.35)
Low Income Rate - Single Males 17.23 2.44 -12.44 -5.26
*(8.84) (6.05) (8.87) (5.14)
Arrest Rate - Single Males 141.52 -36.86 -21.56 -30.25
(94.49) (62.30) (29.22) *(16.87)
Jobless Rate - Single Males 3.95 -4.15 -19.10 -7.08
(7.69) (4.79) **(9.33) *(4.57)
N 1256 1255 877 879
All regressions include controls for differenced market characteristics of females, time fixed effects, marriage-market
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors.
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